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ESTIMATED DAMAGES IN THE HOUSING SECTOR 
CAUSED BY CIVIL DISTURBANCES, SRI LANKA 1983 - 1987, 
AND SUGGESTED RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGIES
INTRODUCTION
It would be difficult, for an outsider who has not seen the war zone to 
imagine the levels of destruction that resulted from the conflict. The 
impression left by press reports throughout the period was that the 
violence was scattered and was limited to isolated guerrilla attacks on 
government installations, busses and bridges. However, such impressions 
are far from the reality of what has been a vicious, intense and highly 
destructive conflict.
The human toll is tragic. An estimated 7,000 lives have been lost and 
thousands more have been wounded. Almost 100,000 families have lost their 
homes; with an average of 5 people per family, this translates to 500,000 
homeless people. Of these, as many as 200,000 people have fled for safety 
to other parts of the country and another 200,000 have fled the country as 
refugees. In other words, over 20% of the people are homeless and about 
10% have been forced into the numbing existence of refugee camps.
The north and east have suffered the greatest disruptions. Fighting 
there has been heavy and very destructive. Many workplaces have been des­
troyed or damaged, and thousands of others closed to protect their assets 
and their employees’ lives. Not only have commercial areas been affected, 
but fighting has been widespread in rural areas as well; thousands of 
farmers have been forced to leave their lands and, in some areas, the 
irrigation systems upon which they are so dependent have been blown up.
Fishermen, suspected of smuggling arms, were special targets. Their 
boats were sunk or destroyed on land, and their villages were often 
singled, out for retaliatory attacks. In some areas, whole fishing 
villages have been destroyed.
Schools were bombed and many forced to close —  the impact on children 
who may never return to school will surely be felt in the future.
Hospitals and clinics were also bombed and, while medical services have 
continued, they have operated under great hardship for both staff and 
patients. Some public health services have faltered, immunizations 
particularly, and the result is that many children have become susceptible 
to diseases from which they are usually protected. A polio epidemic has 
been detected; under normal circumstances all the children in the area 
would have received their preventive vaccine.
It is the physical damages that tell the story. Most of the country 
is flat paddy land. The need to devote as much land as possible to culti­
vation dictates that many people live along the edges of the roads, and it
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was along the roads that much of the fighting was focused. To control an 
area, one had to control the access to it. For the insurgents, this meant 
blowing up bridges and culverts, mining roads at key intersections, sink­
ing ferries, and forcing traffic, especially government patrols, into 
narrow, restricted areas where they could be fired upon from captured 
houses. The government reponse was to establish camps along the roads by 
occupying any installation large enough to use as a base I schools, co­
operative buildings, hospitals, large industrial complexes, etc. In order 
to deny the government the use of these installations, the guerrillas 
attempted to destroy them before they could be occupied. A measure of 
their success is that in some areas there are miles of road where no 
government or semi-government installation is left standing. To keep the 
houses along the roads or near the army’s camps from being used for 
ambushes, the army simply razed the houses. In many cases, the housing 
was not only knocked down, but the debris was physically removed to keep 
the rubble from being piled up and used as a revetment by the rebels. (In 
Jaffna district, the rebels responded by stealing the railway sleepers 
[railroad ties].)
The ratio of houses destroyed to those damaged is another good indi­
cator of the destruction. In most conflicts, the ratio is about l-to-4; 
in Sri Lanka the ratio is 1.5-to-l, i.e., more buildings have been com­
pletely destroyed than just damaged.
As always, the human impact is the most difficult to evaluate. Thou­
sands have lost relatives, and many heads-of-household have been killed. 
Many victims have experienced multiple physical losses: homes, jobs, tools 
and, in some cases, lands losses that not only represent lost income 
but, in a very real sense, lost opportunities. It will be the task of the 
reconstruction program to help reduce these losses as much as possible and 
to alleviate the burden on all the people, but especially the poor, so 
that the people and the country can resume progress toward full develop­
ment .
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AND
RECOMMENDED RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGIES
ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES TO THE HOUSING SECTOR
I. OVERALL ASSESSMENT
Housing is the most extensively damaged sector in the north and east. 
It may account for more than half the total value of all physical losses. 
There are extensive damages in both urban and rural communities. All 
classes of housing have been destroyed, ranging from temporary wood pole 
and cadjan shelters up through high-cost, two-story cement block and brick 
buildings.
Although numerically the Tamil Hindus have experienced the most 
damage, followed by iamil Muslims, all ethnic groups have suffered losses 
and displacements. Approximately one-third of all victims who lost their 
housing were forced to seek shelter more than 10 kms. from their previous 
homes, with more than 150,000 seeking shelter in displaced persons camps 
and 125,000 fleeing the country for asylum in India.
The heaviest losses were borne by low- and low-to-moderate-income 
families. Rural farm families and fishermen make up over 70% of the total 
number of families displaced, according to the voluntary agencies pro­
viding assistance. Over 40% of the displaced had no fixed incomes or 
farmland to which they claimed even custom title (or work rights).
Damages to housing were a result of explosions (aerial bombs, mortars, 
RRGs and ground detonations); fire, predominately as a result of rioting; 
and mechanical razing by bulldozers, tractors or trucks. The ratio of 
destroyed, non-repairable structures to repairable buildings is approxi­
mately 1.5 to 1. By comparison, the ratio in Beirut in 1982 was 1:5, in 
El Salvador 1:9; after a major earthquake, a typical ratio is 1:4. In 
part this is due to the low quality of rural structures and the difficulty 
of repairing some of the wall types (e.g., wattle-and-daub) without 
totally rebuilding them; but overall it is a reflection of the viciousness 
and intensity of the conflict. In numerous villages, 100% of the struc­
tures were destroyed beyond repair. Furthermore, in the majority of 
cases, after a house was destroyed all salvagable or reusable materials 
such as roof sheeting, tiles, wood roof beams, doors and window frames, 
and fittings were looted or destroyed. In many cases, the only reusable 
components of the previous house are the cement floor and a portion of the 
bricks. In comparison, earthquake survivors can usually begin reconstruc­
tion with 30-40% of the materials and costs reclaimed from their previous 
house. In this case, it may be as little as 10% or less.
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The groups most, affected in terms of numbers are:
rural farm families;
—  rural laborers; 
fishermen;
urban low-income families (especially those living in 
encroachments);
families living in towns in structures that were both shops and 
residences.
Housing in the area can be classified as temporary, semi—permanent, 
and permanent. The principal construction types are:
Temporary —  wood pole and cadjan mats
—  wood pole and thatch
wood pole, plywood, and corrugated iron (Cl) 
sheets
Semi-Permanent —  wattle-and-daub
—  mud brick (with cadjan, tile, or Cl sheet roof)
Permanent fired clay brick or cement block with concrete
or asbestos cement sheets for the roof
Damages appear to be in rough proportion to the types of structures 
that existed in the area prior to the violence, or as follows:
Temporary —  30% (occupied by the lowest income groups)
Semi-Permanent 40% (occupied by low- and low-to-moderate- 
income families)
Permanent —  30% (occupied by moderate and upper-income
families)
Persons who reside in houses classified as temporary have no formal 
legal or custom title to their land. Only about half of those in houses 
classified as semi-permanent have any recognized form of tenure. This 
means that loans, which require land ownership or long-term tenure, will 
not be available for half the families unless special provisions are made 
to provide alternative forms of tenure.
Average costs of houses prior to the conflict were:
Temporary —  3-12,000 rupees
Semi-Permanent —  15-30,000 rupees 
Permanent —  35,000+ rupees
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Basea on previous disaster reconstruction experience, prices for each 
category of house can be expected to rise by the following percentages:
Temporary —  10-15% (due to increased cost of roof sheets)
Semi—Permanent 20—30% (due to increased cost of roofing,
labor)
Permanent —  30-50% (due to increased cost of building
materials, competition in labor markets for 
skilled workers)
(Note: The lower percentage of increase to temporary and semi-permanent
housing is due to the fact that most materials are indigenous to the area 
and most components can be self-made.)
The average cost of repairing each class of structure is difficult to 
estimate. The material combinations and methods of construction of the 
temporary and semi-permanent housing are such that repairs are often more 
costly and time-consuming than total reconstruction. Likewise, indigenous 
materials exposed in a damaged building without a complete roof quickly 
deteriorate beyond a point where they can be economically or safely 
repaired. Thus, for planning purposes, the only types of repair that 
should be calculated are for houses made of cement block or brick. The 
range of repair costs is likely to be 50-60% of the total cost since roofs 
and fittings will be the most expensive components to replace. Repair 
costs, by building type, are estimated to be:
Cement block structures: 600 rupees per square meter of
damaged area
Brick structures: 260 rupees per square meter of
damaged area
Government officers surveying damages have asked families to estimate 
their own repair costs. The average cost of repairs, reported by the 
Government Task Force, is approximately 17,000 rupees; the total cost is 
estimated to be 607,750,920 rupees. The housing advisor to the Assessment 
Team estimates that the figure may be low by a factor of 30% since damages 
are often not visible until repairs are actually started (especially in 
masonry buildings which develop base shears when explosions occur in or 
adjacent to a wall).
Table 1 summarizes the author’s estimates of damages, losses, and 
replacement costs. These losses are higher than initial government 
reports for the following reasons:
A. In many cases, government estimates did not include losses to
temporary housing that were destroyed 3-4 years ago; the structural 
remains would have long since deteriorated or been cleared away.
Since the original occupants were displaced, an enumeration by visual 
survey would not have noted the loss.
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_Table I
ESTIMATED DAMAGES IN THE HOUSING SECTOR 
District # Houses Damaged # Houses Destroyed Replacement Cost
Ampara 1,100 1,200 Rs69 mil. ($2.3)
Batticaloa 1,100 6,500 228 mi 1. ( 7.6)
Jaffna 20,000 27,000 1410 mil. (47.0)
Kilinochchi 1,500 1,800 69 mil. ( 2.3)
Mannar 1,000 1,600 78 mil. ( 2.6)
Mullaittivu 2,000 700 81 mil. ( 2.7)
Trineomalee 1,000 22,000 690 mil. (23.0)
Vavuniya 500 7,500 240 mil. ( 8.0)
SUB-TOTAL (N&E) 28,200 68,300 2865 mil. (95.5)
All Other Areas 1,800 1,100 105 mil. ( 3.5)
TOTAL 30,000 69,400 2970 mil. (99.0)
Table II
ESTIMATED SUPPORT COSTS FOR HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION 
District Total Caseload Replacement Cost
Ampara 2,300 Rs. 51.0 mil. ($1.7)
Batticaloa 7,600 168.7 mil. ( 5.6)
Jaffna 47,000 1043.4 mil. (34.7)
Kilinochchi 2,300 51.0 mil. ( 1.7)
Mannar 2,600 57.7 mil. ( 1.9)
Mullaittivu 2,000 59.9 mil. ( 2.0)
Trineomalee 23,000 510.6 mil. (17.2)
Vavuniya 8,000 177.6 mil. ( 5.9)
SUB-TOTAL (N&E) 94,800 2119.9 mil. (70.7)
All Other Areas 2,900 77.7 mil. ( 2.6)
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B. In many cases, more than one family resided in a single structure or 
on a single site. In reconstruction, it is likely that one dwelling 
for each family will have to be considered.
C. Not all surveys had been completed at the time the original report of 
the Task Force was prepared.
The human impact of these losses is severe. The majority of the 
victims, as always, are the poor. Not only have their losses been nearly 
total, they have the least access to replacement resources. Few have 
regular incomes, few have more than custom tenure to land, and many have 
suffered multiple losses. For example, many fishermen lost not only their 
houses, but also their boats, motors and tackle. For the small group of 
upwardly-mobile low-income families who had qualified for agricultural, 
fishing or housing loans, they now have an existing debt that will have to 
be addressed. For the government, this group of multiplely-affected 
victims must be reached quickly with equitable assistance —  yet due to 
its social and economic characteristics, it will be the most difficult 
group to reach.
II. EXISTING PROGRAMS
The government, acting through the Government Agents (GAs), and a 
number of NGOs have been active throughout the conflict providing 
replacement housing. These programs provide a basis for reconstruction 
assistance. During the conflict, people rebuilding their homes were 
entitled to a 3000-rupee grant from the government. In many cases this 
was matched by 3000-3500 rupees more in cash or in kind. With technical 
assistance from the NGO, people then built a one—room, 25—square—meter 
structure of brick or block with a cement floor and a small verandah.
Most roofs were made of cadjan, although many people chose to use tile or 
cement sheets. The design was such that the house could easily be 
expanded at a future date.
Since the signing of the peace accord, the government has agreed to 
provide displaced persons and refugees with a 1,000-rupee "settling in" 
allowance. (In rural areas, farmers are also eligible to receive 
agricultural supplies of a value up to 1,500 rupees in kind.) The 
voluntary agencies currently do not have the capacity to match the funding 
for all those requiring housing.
A number of new NGOs have indicated that they will initiate housing 
reconstruction programs. Most important of these is the Red Cross which 
has announced plans to build 3,000 houses in the north and east at a cost 
of 20-25,000 rupees each.
One government program that offers a good possibility for reaching 
large numbers of people who could qualify for a loan is the Million Houses 
Program. Initiated by the Prime Minister in 1984, the program has two 
principal sub-programs: one for urban and one for rural families. Under 
these, families may borrow up to 15,000 rupees (urban) and 7,500 rupees 
(rural) at subsidized rates of 9% and 6% respectively. Loans may be for a 
new house; repairs, upgrading or expansion; utilities; or sites and 
services. The program is administered through the Thrift and Credit
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Cooperative Society.■ (The program provided some loans in the affected 
area during the conflict, and the National Housing Development Authority 
reports that a high rate of return was maintained during the period.)
To qualify for a loan, people must have a title or permit for their 
land. Loan counsellors work with each family to determine the amount of 
the loan based on the client’s ability to pay. The principal advantages 
of the scheme are that the loans determine the building technology and the 
technology becomes self-limiting so that people do not overborrow. The 
program could be used separately or in conjunction with the Ministry of 
Rehabilitation’s reconstruction allowances.
III. ISSUES IN HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION
A number of issues will surface quickly in relation to housing recon­
struction. They are:
A. Land Tenure: There will be many opportunities to help people acquire 
formal tenure. For example, the process of resettling people on crown 
land could be accelerated, as could the issuance of tenure permits to 
those already encroaching on crown lands.
E * Cadas tra 1 Data: Many p>eople ’ s land tenure p>ap>ers may have been
destroyed or lost during the disturbances. Issuance of replacement 
papers and re—recording of property descriptions may be necessary, 
especially in new zones of the larger towns and cities. Support for 
cadastral surveys may be necessary to help people qualify for loans.
E'* future Resettlement: The final form of government and regional devo­
lution may precipitate localized migrations of ethnics moving from one 
area to another in order to keep from being in a numerical minority.
A portion of reconstruction funds should be held back for this 
contingency.
D - Combined Casework: Since many victims will have multiple needs, they
will be eligible for assistance in more than one sector. To eliminate 
confusion and to reduce the need for clients to make multiple appli­
cations for assistance (as well as to reduce the potential for over­
borrowing or misuse of available assistance), a combined casework 
approach should be established.
E- Timing: Experience has shown that the housing sector will be the last
to recover fully. Low-to-moderate-income families, especially those 
with multiple losses, may take as long as 5-7 years to accumulate the 
resources necessary to rebuild. Therefore, planners should:
1. consider measures which will help accelerate the pace of economic 
reconstruction.
2. plan projects that will provide income-earning opportunities for 
low-income families, especially seasonal farm laborers.
3. consider indirect measures to lower people’s immediate costs of 
living.
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4. provide sufficient reserves in housing loans so that money will 
be available several years from now when people are ready to 
participate.
F. Sequence of Activities: The sequence of reconstruction is likely to
be as follows: First, the lowest income groups, who normally build
houses of local materials, will rebuild. These people can best be 
assisted with grants and subsidized sales of building materials 
(through material "yards" or government stores).
Next, wealthier urban families will rebuild and repair. Along with 
urban commercial structures, this will set off a minor building and 
employment "boom".
Upper-middle-income families will begin about 4-6 months later. Ini­
tially it will be this group that will take advantage of loan or 
credit schemes.
Moderate-income families that can qualify for loans will follow the 
first group approximately 6-8 months later.
At the one-year mark, low-to-moderate-income families will commence 
building semi-permanent and permanent housing. How long this last 
group takes to complete their rehousing will depend on the avail­
ability of funds, the rate of inflation for building materials, and 
the other assistance provided in relation to their source of income 
(and how secure their jobs are perceived to be).
Housing reconstruction could be accelerated by:
1. subsidizing building material sales
2. increasing the housing grant
3. aiding the self-help reconstruction process, especially through 
small-scale community organizing
4. timing labor-intensive works projects to coincide with housing 
reconstruction cycles
G* NGO Competition: New NGOs are now offering to rebuild housing for the
victims. Some are offering to follow the existing programs set up 
during the conflict, others want to use other approaches. To ensure 
that all victims are treated equitably, the government should esta­
blish uniform reconstruction standards and policies to guide all the 
agencies and should enforce strict compliance.
Use of Local Materials: Almost all the materials used in housing can
be manufactured, produced or obtained locally. As part of the recon­
struction policy, the government should stress that all houses built 
with government assistance should use locally-produced materials and 
components.
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IV. RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY
In carrying out the reconstruction program, it will be necessary to 
have a mix of programs in order to reach all of the different economic 
strata of the victims, For example, only a small group will qualify for 
loans, therefore, grants and subsidized sales of building materials will 
be' needed to assist those who cannot obtain credit.
In order to reach the maximum number of people, the following program 
strategies should be considered:
.Sub-projects: Activities in each sector and each community
should be planned so that they are complementary. For example, road 
repair actions that will employ large numbers of temporary laborers 
should be planned to coincide with the initiation of material sales 
lor housing so that people will have ready cash for purchasing 
building supplies. It is recommended that authorities work with each 
village or neighborhood to develop integrated projects.
‘M liple-Objgctive Planning: It is important that all expenditures be
planned to meet multiple objectives, to the greatest extent possible. 
For example, rubble clearance activities can be carried out by heavy 
machinery, but that will result only in clearing the debris. If the 
work is done by hand labor, not only will the debris be removed but 
people who need cash will receive it. With careful planning, almost 
all expenditures can have two or more benefits.
C* Sequential Operations: Reconstruction programs, even more than normal
development programs, are sensitive to sequential actions. Planners 
should recognize the normal phases of reconstruction programs and plan 
to commit resources when they are most appropriate and can best be 
utilized. In the housing sector, for example, it is best to focus on 
getting building materials into the community at low cost as the first 
priority, before building demands create inflation and parallel mar­
kets . This should be followed quickly by loan programs for middle- 
and moderate-income families (in order to create a labor market for 
low-income workers). Loans for lower-income groups should follow 
these since by then people will have had an opportunity to earn some 
money and to buy materials at a low price.
BUPlp-ciog Spent Capital: Reconstruction programs are noted for strip­
ping communities of working capital. Since reconstruction needs may 
cut across many sectors, there is a danger that purchases and loan 
repayments can quickly deplete the available capital. Therefore, it 
is necessary to continually plan projects that will inject new sources 
of money into the affected communities. For example, if building 
materials are sold by the government, a portion of the reflow money 
should be used for labor-intensive, community-based projects so that 
the proceeds will go back to the victims.
^ ’ Uniform Reconstruction Policies: The government can expect a large
group of NGOs to offer their assistance in reconstruction, especially
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in the housing sector. Each of these agencies will have its own 
agenda., its own clientele, and its own way of doing things. Some will 
want to give houses away; others will want to subsidize; still others 
may offer loans. The issue facing the government will be equity, that 
is, ensuring that every affected family has equal access to recon­
struction benefits. Diverse services and competition between NGOs can 
be very destructive and, in the end, the government will take the 
blame for any unequal services. Thus it is extremely important that 
the government set uniform reconstruction policies and standards and 
ensure that all NGOs conform to these norms. At a minimum, the 
following policies are recommended:
1. Housing Grants: All grants given by NGOs should be in the same
amount or have equal material value. Currently, NGOs are pro­
viding a matching grant of approximately 3,500 rupees (or 
assistance in kind equivalent to that amount) to the government’s 
own donation of 3,000 rupees. This seems reasonable and could be 
the basis for a uniform standard. (The government may wish to 
consider raising the allocation in urban areas to 4,500 rupees 
and asking NGOs to provide a matching 4,500 rupees.)
2. Loans: The most active and successful loan program for low-to-
moderate-income families is the Million Houses Program with loans 
of 7,500 rupees for rural people (at 6%) and 15,000 rupees for 
urban families (at 9%). All loans offered by NGOs should conform 
to this standard.
3. Material Subsidies: The subsidy should be uniform for all sales
of building materials. It is recommended that the subsidy rate 
be set at 50% of the purchase cost for critical items (wall and 
roof materials) and 25% for non-critical items (fittings, finish­
ings , etc.).
1. Policy on Housing Give-aways: The gift of a free house should be
restricted to those people who have been multiplely affected and 
who are completely unable to rebuild a house for themselves.
This group could include widows, abandoned women with dependent 
children,^ the elderly, handicapped, etc. The practice of an NGO 
adopting and rebuilding a model village should be prohibited.
V. RECOMMENDED APPROACH
The following program is recommended for reconstriaction in the housing 
sector. It is based on the realization that the low—income group most in 
need will be the most difficult to reach and will have the least access to 
needed resources. It is based on an approach of targeting a combination 
of programs at each economic stratum in the affected community.
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A * Planning Assumptions: Program recommendations are based on the fol­
lowing assumptions.
1. Average costs of replacement housing according to income strata 
are:
Group A: Low-income housing, rural areas - 10,000 rupees
Group B: Low-income housing, urban areas - 20,000 rupees
Group C: Moderate-income housing, rural areas - 20,000 rupees
Group I): Moderate-income housing, urban areas - 35,000 rupees
Group E: Upper-income housing (all areas) - 50,000 rupees
2. Number of families requiring assistance in each group:
Group A - 30,000 
Group B - 20,000 
Group C - 25,000 
Group D - 15,000 
Group E - 10,000
3. Estimated capital requirements for reconstruction are:
Group A - 300 million rupees (approx. 10 million dollars)
Group B - 400 million rupees (approx. 13.3 million dollars)
Group C - 500 million rupees (approx. 16.6 million dollars)
Group D - 525 million rupees (approx. 17.5 million dollars)
Group E - 500 million rupees (approx. 16.6 million dollars)
Total A-E 2.25 billion rupees (approx. 74 million dollars)
(Note. For planning purposes, all houses have been valued at total 
replacement cost; no adjustment has been made for repairable units.)
B * EL2g.r_am Components: It is recommended that housing reconstruction be
assisted with four programs: grants-in~aid for persons who have lost 
their houses, sale of subsidized building materials; provision of 
low-interest loans for low-to-moderate-income families; and provision 
of long-term normal market interest loans for qualified moderate- and 
upper-income families. These programs would be supported by a series 
of projects in other sectors which would have money set aside for 
employment of low-income workers, enabling them to acquire needed 
Capital in order to participate in the various housing programs.
1. Grants-in-Aid: The government’s program of providing a cash
allowance of 3,000 rupees to each family that lost a house should 
be continued and expanded. NGOs and bilateral donors should be 
encouraged to provide a matching grant for families in Groups A 
and B. Total capital required: Government contribution - 300
million rupees (10 million dollars); additional grant—in—aid 
support - 150 million rupees (5 million dollars). In order to 
meet their share of the program, NGOs would need 175 million 
rupees or 5.83 million dollars.
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2. Sales of Subsidized Materials: Families in Groups A - D should
have access to a limited amount of building materials at a subsi­
dized price of approximately 50% of the normal market price. The 
amount of materials that any one family could purchase would be 
determined by the amount needed to construct a moderate one-room 
house of brick or cement block (approximately 25 square meters). 
The sales could be handled by the government at material "yards" 
set up m  each community or they could be subcontracted to 
cooperatives. Proceeds of the sales would be used in two ways: 
the first tranche would be used to purchase more materials to 
se 1, the second block of proceeds would be placed in a local 
community development fund. At an appropriate time during the 
irst year, the community would select a labor-intensive project 
(or series of projects) that would benefit the community as a 
whole, and the funds would be used to complete these projects. 
Projects could include: road construction, school construction, 
day care facilities, community buildings, religious facilities, 
etc., but should be projects not undertaken by government or 
other reconstruction activities. Capital requirements: 425
?rll^ n (approximately 14 million dollars), assuming
8o,000 eligibles x 5,000 rupees, or half the cost of a rural 
brick house.
3. Low interest Loans: The best way to reach the majority of low-
to moderate-income people who could qualify for low-interest 
loans will be to support the Million Houses Program or to open a 
window at the SMIB (State Mortgage Investment Bank) and provide a 
comparable loan program. While the amounts loaned may be 
considered comparatively small in relation to needs in the area, 
if the other components of the program suggested here are 
implemented (especially the grants-in-aid and the subsidized 
material sales), the overall amount that each family needs to 
borrow will be greatly reduced. The capital contribution for
m  n ™ tereSt l0anS is.aPPr°ximately 300 million rupees (based on 
4U,000 potential applicants borrowing an average of 7,500 rupees 
each) or approximately 10 million dollars.
4. Normal-Market-Rate Loans: Approximately 10,000 families will
qualify for loans at normal market rates. The amount they may 
want to borrow may be as high as 700 million rupees (23 million 
dollars). This could be provided through a special reconstruc­
tion window at the SMIB or through normal commercial banks.
Since there should be a high recovery rate which can be reloaned 
throughout the reconstruction period, only about half the total 
amount must be provided through external funding, or 375 million 
rupees (11.5 million dollars).
An additional class of loan that should be handled through the 
commercial banks or the reconstruction window is loans to people 
who will rebuild structures that function as both a house and a 
s op. Since part of the loan will be for housing, the goverment 
may wish to consider subsidizing a portion of the loan, carrying 
it with a ballooning interest rate, or figuring the interest at 
two parallel rates. Approximately 3,500 families require this 
type of assistance, at an average replacement cost of 50,000 
rupees each or 175 million rupees (5.8 million dollars).
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5. Other Housing Sector Projects: In support of reconstruction
activities, the government should plan to carry out a series of 
projects to help provide cash and material resources in the 
affected communities. These projects could include:
a) brick and cement block-making enterprises;
b) production of cement roofing sheets;
c) tile-making;
d) establishment of carpentry enterprises to 
windows, other wood fittings, etc.;
build doors and
e) cadjan mat production (particularly for employment of 
women);
f) establishment of salvage groups to reclaim 
the rubble for low-cost sale to low-income
materials from 
families.
The goverment could support these activities by providing low- 
interest loans to local cooperative societies and private 
enterprises for facilities, equipment and supplies. It should be 
a matter of policy for the government to support these activities 
by purchasing government supplies through these new businesses 
whenever possible. Approximately 75 million rupees (2.5 million 
dollars) should be allocated for loans in this sector. Loans 
should be at about half the market rate.
The Ministry of Local Government, Housing & Construction launched 
a program for training people in the construction trades. An IDA 
loan of 12.5 million dollars was obtained in 1982 to establish 
the program. One sub-project of the program is training of rural 
villagers in masonry and carpentry skills for participation in 
the Million Houses Program. This project should be reviewed to 
determine whether it could be expanded for the reconstruction 
program. Other options for using this program include: expan­
sion of the artisan training activities; adding a new division to 
teach building materials production skills and methods; and 
training small contractors in how to manage their operations more 
efficiently. It is possible that 30 million rupees (one million 
dollars) could be added to this program for operations in the 
affected areas.
^ _Implications: With this approach, each income group
would receive the following package of assistance:
Group A: 3,000-rupee grant from government; possibly 3,500 rupees
from a NGO; all building materials needed for their house at 
half-price. Total initial cash outlay needed by family: O.
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Group B: 3,000-rupee grant from government; possibly 3,500 rupees
from a NGO; all building materials needed for their house at 
half-price. Total initial cash outlay needed by family:
7000 rupees.
Group C: 3,000-rupee grant from government; possibly 3,500 rupees
from a NGO; half the building materials needed for their 
house at half-price; access to low-interest loan to finance 
balance needed for reconstruction of house. Total initial 
cash outlay needed by family: 0.
Group D: 3,000-rupee grant from government; possibly 3,500 rupees
from a NGO; half the building materials needed for their 
house at half-price; access to low-interest loan that will 
cover balance of cash needed. Total initial cash outlay 
needed by family: 7000 rupees.
Group E: 3,000-rupee grant from government; 20% of the building
materials needed for their house at half-price; access to 
long-term loan. Average immediate outlay: 10,000 rupees.
With this approach, the benefits are maximized, the initial investment 
is substantially reduced, and money flowing into the community is 
continuously recirculated. Most important, the program reaches those 
most in need quickly and efficiently.
D. Political Advantages: Because the program can move quickly, victims
of the conflict will be able to realize benefits quickly, thereby 
reducing frustration and discord. Material sales can start imme­
diately, as can the grants-in-aid. Loan programs, if operated, through 
the Million Houses Program, can also start very quickly. The only new 
mechanisms required are the loans at the SMIB for upper-income 
families and people living in combined store/home structures.
Advantages of the Approach: This approach:
1. keeps the government and reconstruction authorities free from 
dealing with land issues (since grants and sales leave the issue 
untouched);
2. meets immediate needs of the largest segment quickly;
3. can be run by the government under the present administrative 
arrangement, but can easily be switched later to a more localized 
administration, i.e., there is not a large bureaucracy to trans­
fer or reorganize.
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VI. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Administration: The following groups could be given initial responsi­
bility for carrying out the program:
1. Grants-in-aid disbursements: GAs with donations channeled
through the Ministry of Rehabilitation; matching grants from the 
NGOs acting with their own funds or those provided by bilateral 
donors.
2. Material sales: Sales at yards established by the GAs or DAs
(District Administrators) or, alternatively, sales contracted to 
cooperatives in each community. If co-ops handle the program, 
they should be allowed to keep a small percentage for their 
operating costs.
3. Low-interest loans: Loans would be made by the Credit and Thrift
Co-ops under the normal mechanisms. Alternatively, loans could 
be administered by the SMIB.
4. Conventional loans: These would be administered through a recon­
struction window set up by the SMIB.
B. GQYfPTjiEg'pt Capacity to Administer the Program: This program is well 
within the capacity of the government to operate and manage. Most of 
the activities are straightforward, simple, and should not require 
large numbers of new staff. The loan component builds on an existing 
successful program administered by long—established co-ops and the 
only new program —  the normal rate loans —  would be handled by an 
established bank with experience in loaning to this clientele.
C. lechnical Assistance: The housing reconstruction component should
require only minimal technical assistance. The material sales and 
reflow component is a well-established approach and manuals are 
available (notably from USAID). Likewise there are several well-known 
consultants and several international NGOs who have experience in this 
type of program.
jPUPloynient Aspects: Despite the large investment required in recon­
struction of housing, the actual number of new jobs created will be 
relatively small. Most people build their own houses or rely on local 
masons and carpenters who would be able to take care of the demands 
for smaller houses produced for Groups A and B, as well as a large 
percentage of housing for Groups C and D. There will be some new 
employment opportunities created by reconstruction of housing for 
Group E and the upper end of Group D, but most employment in the 
construction sector is likely to come from reconstruction of commer­
cial buildings.
Reconstruction will require production of a large quantity of building 
materials, especially block and brick, and these activities can employ 
a fairly large number of people for a period of about 3 years.
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The total number of new jobs created by housing construction can be 
estimated on the basis of permanent buildings under constructions 
about 1 permanent job per 30 houses) about 1 temporary job per 20 
houses; 1 part-time job per 10 houses. Based, on these ratios, the 
jobs that are likely to be created are:
Permanent: 583 (18%)
Temporary: 875 (27%) \
Part-time: 1750 (55%)
I he total amount of new (additional) income generated per year is 
estimated to be:
1. Master Builders (assuming 1 per 10 workers):
320 x Rs. 100 per day x 312 work days = Rs. 9,984,000
Skilled carpenters and masons (assuming 4 per 10 workers):
1280 x Rs. 75 per day x 312 work days = Rs. 29,952,000
3. Laborers (assuming 5 per 10 workers):
1600 x Rs. 50 x 156 work days - Rs. 12,480,000
The total yearly estimate: Rs. 52,416,000 ($1,747,200)
Total peak reconstruction estimate (3 years): Rs. 157,248,000 
($5,241,000)
15
ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES IN THE COMMERCIAL SECTOR
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RECONSTRUCTION
I. OVERALL ASSESSMENT
Commercial structures of all classes received extensive damage 
throughout the north and east. Damages to these structures may account 
for 20% of the total value of all physical losses. There are extensive 
damages in both urban and rural communities. While all sizes of buildings 
have been destroyed, the group most affected are moderate-sized shops in 
the urban areas and in smaller trading centers along the main roads.
Although many of the smaller micro-enterprises affected by the 
fighting were able to stay in business by simply moving out of harm's way, 
most of the moderate and larger commercial businesses which lost their 
place of business were put out of service for the duration of the 
conflict. Approximately one-third of the owners of businesses out of 
service reported that they had no income after their business premises 
were destroyed.
Many of those who lost their premises were renters of the structures 
(approximately 60%). For this group, the place of business will be an 
important factor in determining their reconstruction options since many 
were service enterprises. Among the rental properties, approximately one- 
hali were owned by landlords who owned and rented more than one property, 
oince it will be difficult to provide loans for multiple reconstructions, 
the relatively low ratio of multiplely-owned buildings is a positive 
factor in commercial reconstruction.
Damages to commercial buildings were due to fire (as a result of 
rioting and looting) and explosions from aerial bombs, mortars, RPGs and 
ground detonations. In the larger towns and cities, many commercial 
"districts" were attacked by mobs or by engaged forces and the level of 
destruction is quite high, in some cases 75%. In some of the smaller 
villages, 100% of the commercial structures have been destroyed. For 
these smaller toms and villages, the economic centers of the community 
have been affected and it is very important to ensure that they get back 
in operation as soon as possible to support the economic structure of the 
villages. Studies of earthquake-damaged communities point to the 
seriousness of this revitalization; in communities in Guatemala that lost 
their economic centers, out-migration to the larger cities and the capital 
amounted to a 25A shift in the population in a two-year period.
Commercial enterprises in the area can be classified as micro- 
enterprises, small businesses and large businesses. (Commercial esta­
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blishments such as banks, cooperatives and semi-public enterprises are not 
considered in this section.) Distribution was as follows:
Micro-enterprises - 40%
Small businesses - 55%
Large businesses - 5%
Micro-enterprises occupied temporary and semi-permanent buildings, 
while the small and larger businesses occupied buildings made of permanent 
materials. It is the permanent buildings that will be of most concern in 
the reconstruction program.
( The vast majority of damaged commercial structures were one-room 
buildings. Many were attached to others or were subdivisions of larger 
commercial strip or row structures that shared common walls. Thus when 
one store was attacked, damages easily spread to the adjoining store.
Buildings can be classified according to the approximate size and 
number of rooms.
Class A buildings: 100+ square meters
Class B buildings: 50-100 square meters
Class C buildings: 25-50 square meters
The cost range for permanent buildings prior to the conflict was:
Class A: 100,000+ Rupees
Class B: 51-100,000 Rupees
Class C: 25-50,000 Rupees
The average cost of replacing each class of structure is difficult to 
estimate. Most owners will want to replace their structure wTith a 
slightly larger building and to use the best materials they can afford.
For planning purposes, it would be best to calculate the costs based on an 
average per-square-meter cost in block or brick. The per-unit costs, by 
building type, are estimated to be:
Cement block structures: Rs. 1,500 per square meter
Br ick structures: Rs. 1,200 per square meter of damaged area
Government officers surveying damages have asked the property owners 
to estimate their replacement costs. The average cost of repairs, 
reported by the Government Task Force, is approximately Rs. 70,000; the 
total cost is estimated to be Rs. 576 million. On one hand, these 
estimates may be low since they do not account for inflation; on the other 
hand, they may be inflated since people may be figuring on the cost of an 
expanded building.
The average cost of repairing each class of structure is also diffi­
cult to estimate. The material combinations and construction methods of 
the older buildings are such that repairs are often more costly and 
time-consuming than total reconstruction. In the case of buildings that 
are attached or in strip developments, it may be possible for some cost
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sharing but, overall, it, will be best to calculate the total repair costs 
on the cost of rehabing each structure separately. Costs can be calcu­
lated on the per-square-meter costs for structures made of block or 
brick. Repair costs, by building type, are estimated to be:
Cement brock structures: Rs. 1,800 per square meter
Br ick structures. Rs. 1,500 per square meter of damaged area
Government officers surveying damages have asked owners to estimate 
their repair costs. The average cost of repairs, reported by the 
Government Task Force, is approximately 36,000 rupees; the total cost is 
estimated to be Rs. 111.1 million.
It is important to remember that these losses are only to structures 
the shops and businesses have also lost inventories, equipment, tools 
and value-added, commodities. In some cases, the structural loss will be 
far less than other cumulative losses.
The economic impact of these losses on the micro level is relatively 
severe. Each damaged structure represents cash flow that is curtailed 
and, as long as the buildings are not replaced, the businesses in most 
cases are not operating. For small communities, this can have an impact 
beyond the loss of economic opportunity for the owner of the enterprise; 
it also means that the people in the community must devote time and money 
to going elsewhere for their goods and services.
It is important for the government to find ways to assist the small 
businesses to re-start as soon as possible. The housing and job needs of 
the overall community will necessarily be the top priority but, without 
funding for building reconstruction (which will create more new jobs than 
lousing reconstruction) and revitalization of the small business sector, 
complete reconstruction cannot be achieved. Disaster studies have 
indicated that approximately one-third of all small businesses go out of 
business as a result of disasters and an inability to recover from both 
the direct losses and the time out of service. While other enterprises 
are usually formed to replace them, they generally represent a shift of 
ownership to the hands of wealthier people in the community. Such a 
concentration of resources is not only unjust; it also has a potential 
political cost.
II. EXISTING PROGRAMS
At the present time, there are no plans to aid this sector. A number 
of NGOs have indicated that they may initiate programs for special target 
groups (elderly, handicapped, former combatants, etc.), but no firm plans 
have been announced and most of the activities are expected to be on the 
micro-enterprise end of the spectrum.
IIT. ISSUES IN COMMERCIAL RECONSTRUCTION
A number of issues will surface quickly in relation to commercial 
reconstruction. They are:
ClMPetition for Funds: Commercial reconstruction is often viewed as
competing for social reconstruction funds (i.e., housing, agriculture, 
etc.). It should be recognized, however, that it is extremely 
important to reach small and moderate businesses with funds in order 
to keep them from going out of business and to help revitalize rural 
service centers.
iple Needs: Many owners of affected businesses will also have 
lost houses and other personal property. Since they may have to 
borrow money for other needs, it may be necessary to make special 
adjustments on a case-by-case basis so that families will not be 
forced into debts they cannot reasonably be expected to repay.
C * Combined Casework: Since many victims will have multiple needs, they
w i H  eligible for assistance in more than one sector. To eliminate 
confusion and reduce the need to make multiple applications for 
assistance {as well as to reduce the potential for over-borrowing or 
misuse of the available assistance), a combined casework approach 
should be established.
^ * Timing. Experience has shown that the small commercial sector will be 
slow to recover fully unless funds are specifically targeted for this 
sector. It is especially important to make low-interest loans to 
Class B and C businesses. These groups may take as long as 5-7 years 
to recover fully. Therefore, planners should:
1. consider measures which will help accelerate the pace of economic 
reconstruction;
2. plan to provide assistance that will help businesses not only 
replace their buildings but also recover some of their inven­
tories ;
3. provide sufficient cash in the near term so that marginal busi­
nesses can survive;
4. provide enough money in the near term to create a "building boom" 
to provide jobs for other conflict victims.
Reconstruction could be accelerated by: 
subsidizing building material sales;
providing a cash grant tor partial replacement of inventories or 
tools and equipment;
providing small short-term loans for replacing inventories and 
fixed equipment;
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adopting a policy that, to the greatest extent possible, 
procurement of reconstruction materials and supplies will be 
accomplished through local suppliers to help rejuvenate their 
businesses.
IV. RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY
In carrying out the reconstruction program, it will be necessary to 
have a mix of programs in order to reach all of the different classes of 
business. Bor example, only small and large businesses will qualify for 
loans, and those only for buildings and fixed equipment. Therefore, some 
grants and other (orms of assistance will be needed to assist those who 
cannot obtain credit.
In order to reach the maximum number of businesses, the following
program strategies should be considered:
A. Buileting Giants. A small grant of 10,000 rupees should be given to 
owner—occupants of small. Class C businesses that were destroyed or 
damaged in the conflict. (NGOs should be encouraged to give a 
matching grant of approximately 3,500 rupees or assistance in kind 
equivalent to that amount wherever possible.)
B* IjUUzdlJdtltClif Bui,Iding Loans: A loan of up to 50,000 rupees should be
made to owners of Class B and C businesses. The interest rate should 
be 9-12%.
c * iIding Loans: Reconstruction loans for owners of Class A
and B businesses at normal or near-normal interest rates should be 
made for reconstruction of larger buildings and for replacing equip­
ment, tools, etc.
Material Subsidies: Current plans propose the sale of building
materials on a subsidized basis for reconstruction of housing. Owners 
of Class C businesses would also be eligible to purchase building 
materials at the special rate.
E * Grant for Inventory Replacement: A cash grant of 3000 rupees should
be given to owners of Class C businesses and to proprietors of micro- 
enterprises to help them re-establish their inventories.
V. COSTS
A* Planning Assumptions: Program recommendations are based on the
following assumptions:
1. Average costs of replacement buildings according to building 
class are:
Class A - Rs. 200,000 
Class B - Rs. 75,000 
Class C - Rs. 40,000
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2. Estimated number of businesses requiring assistance in each 
group:
Class A - 575
Class B - 6,320 
Class C - 4,600
3. Estimated capital requirements for reconstruction of buildings:
Class A - 115 million rupees (approx. 3.8 million dollars)
Class B - 474 million rupees (approx. 15.8 million dollars)
Class C - 184 million rupees (approx. 6.1 million dollars)
Total A-C: 773 million rupees (approx. 25.7 million dollars)
(Note. For planning purposes, all buildings have been valued at 
total replacement cost; no adjustment has been made for repair­
able units.)
4. Estimated number of buildings eligible for assistance:
Class A - 345 (60%)
Class B - 2,530 (40%)
Class C - 2,300 (50%)
B * gQgL_Pf Program Components: Reconstruction assistance will include:
1* Building Grants: 10,000-rupee grant for all owner-occupants of
Class C businesses destroyed or damaged: Rs.23 million ($7.6
million).
2. Low-Interest Building Loans: maximum 50,000 rupees for Class B
and C businesses. Average loan would be Rs. 35,000. Total cost: 
Rs. 915 million ($30.5 million).
3. Normal-Interest-Rate Building Loans: reconstruction loans for
Class A and B businesses. Estimated average loan: Rs.100,000. 
Total allocation: Rs.300 million ($10 million).
4. Material Subsidies: Material sales for owners of Class C busi­
nesses: Total amount to be subsidized: Rs.142.6 million (4.7
million dollars).
o. Grant for Inventory Replacement: 3000 rupees to owners of Class
C businesses and micro-enterprises. Estimated number of grants: 
4,600. Total cost: Rs.13.8 ($460 thousand).
C* Cqst/Fj,nance Implications: With this approach, each class of business
would receive the following packages of assistance:
Class A: Long-term loan (no maximum).
Class B: Long-term, low-interest loans for some qualified borrowers;
normal loans for others.
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Class C: Rs.3,000 grant from government, possibly matched by a NGO;
half the building materials needed for their building at 
half-price, access to a low—interest loan to finance balance 
needed for reconstruction of building.
Micro-enterprises would receive a Rs. 3,000 grant from government, 
possibly matched by a NGO, and all the building materials needed for 
their building at half-price.
With this approach, the benefits are maximized and the program reaches 
those most, in need quickly and efficiently, thereby reducing frustra­
tion and discord. Material sales can start immediately, as can the 
grants-in-aid. Loan programs may take some time but, with the other 
assistance available, some degree of economic reconstruction can start 
quickly.
The total cost of the program is estimated to be: Rs. 1.4 billion
($46.5 million).
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
^ istration: The following groups could be given initial respon­
sibility for carrying out the program:
1. Grants-in-aid disbursements: GAs, with donations channeled
through the Ministry of Rehabilitation. Matching grants from the 
NCjOs acting with their own funds or those provided by bilateral 
donors.
2. Material sales: Sales at yards established to support housing
reconstruction activities. These would be administered by the 
GAs or DAs or, alternatively, sales could be contracted to co­
operatives in each community.
Low—interest loans: Loans would be made through a reconstruction
window set up by the SMIB.
4* Conventional loans: These would be administered through the
commercial banks.
Government Capacity to Administer the Program: This program is well
within the government's capacity to operate and manage. Most of the 
activities are straightforward and simple, and should not require 
large numbers of new staff. Portions of the program would borrow from 
the programs set up for housing reconstruction; others would build on 
the experience of the government in supporting refugees and displaced 
persons.
C. Technical Assistance: The commercial reconstruction component should
require only minimal technical assistance. Technical assistance for 
the construction and material sales components would be covered in the 
housing reconstruction program support. Loan programs are well within 
the capabilities of existing institutions to manage.
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COMPETING DEMANDS FOR RECONSTRUCTION RESOURCES
A major concern in any reconstruction program is the availability of 
building materials and other resources on an equitable basis and at fair 
prices for all families, businesses and public enterprises in the affected 
areas, throughout the reconstruction process. In a situation with as much 
widespread devastation as the north and eastern districts of Sri Lanka, 
tiie progress oi reconstruction will be affected as much by the price of 
building materials as by their availability and, of course, price will be 
determined by availability.
A. Materials that are likely to be in short supply are;
j. Bricks. Production oi fired clay bricks is common throughout the 
north and east. Producers include small cottage enterprises that 
make supplies for local villagers, larger cooperative brickmaking 
kilns, and a few large-scale companies that produce good commer­
cial quality bricks. Many of the larger operations were affected 
by the fighting and, even if they resume operation soon, they 
will be hampered by a shortage of transport and fuel (coal is 
delivered by lorry). Although the smaller cottage industries 
will be able to produce some bricks, shortages will appear 
primarily in the rural areas; demands from urban areas will cause 
a price rise and the bricks produced at small kilns will flow to 
the cities.
1. Cement blocks: Cement blocks are mostly produced by small
cottage industries. Production may be affected by availability 
of both sand and cement, as well as the cost to transport them, 
since many of the lorries in the region have been lost in the 
f ighting.
3. Cement: Cement is produced at a large cement plant in Jaffna
but, during the conflict, cement production was curtailed. Large 
supplies of cement will be needed for repair and rehabilitation 
of industrial facilities, commercial structures, private upper- 
and moderate-income residences, and for repair of many public 
works. It is estimated that 250 thousand tons of cement will be 
needed over a three-year period. This is equivalent to about a 
quarter of Sri Lanka’s current production capacity.
4. Iron rebar: Demands for rebar for commercial and industrial
reconstruction, as well as bridge and road reconstruction, may 
cause a short-term rise in price.
5. Gravel: Gravel i s used in both road work and concrete production
(although different grades). Gravel production and transport are 
both under capacity at present due to restraints on blasting and 
lack of transport.
6. Construction timber: Wood of all kinds is likely to be in short
supply. Timber is scarce island—wide due to deforestation, and 
few timber resources exist in the north. The widespread damage
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to roofs of all kinds will create a high demand for lumber.
Unless supplies can be allocated quickly, prices are likely to be 
unreasonably high (and possibly beyond the reach of the rural 
poor).
7. Roof tiles: Roof tiles are normally produced by the same crafts­
men who make bricks. The problems and shortages will be the 
same.
0. Cement roof sheets. Corrugated cement roof sheets are a popular 
type of roofing, especially for low-to-moderate-income families. 
They are not only an economic way of covering the roof but also 
lequire less, and lighter, wTood than a tile roof. Some sheets 
are made in Sri Lanka, but many are imported. Shortages and 
corresponding price increases are likely to force many people to 
switch to tile to cover their roofs. Production of alternative 
types of sheets is not difficult and can be done as a cottage or 
cooperative venture. Since the material is popular and is likely 
to be in short demand, it should be possible to provide some 
start-up capital to small-scale entrepreneurs to increase pro­
duction. Alternatives to using asbestos as the forming media 
should be stressed.
9. Cl sheets: Corrugated iron (Cl) sheets are less popular than
cement sheets (since they absorb rather than deflect heat) but 
are nonetheless widely used since they provide a cheap means of 
covering houses. The sheets are produced from rolled steel which 
is imported, but final processing is done at a rolling mill in 
the country. Prices are not likely to climb at the production 
end, but transport costs and shortages may raise the final cost 
significantly.
B. Equipment likely to be in short supply includes:
1. Lorries: The lack of trucks of all types may be the single most
important constraint on activities and costs in the construction 
sector. Most lorries in the area were commandeered and destroyed 
during the fighting or withdrawn from the zone of conflict. Ini­
tially, building materials transport vehicles such as tippers, 
large flat-bed lorries, and some tractor-trailor units (for 
timber and rebar) are likely to be dear.
2. Heavy construction equipment: Contractors will initially be
unwilling to commit expensive, highly visible equipment to the 
area. This will slow some projects (e.g., road reconstruction) 
but should have only a short-term effect on the overall construc­
tion sector.
Skilled workers are also likely to be in great demand. Masons, car­
penters, concrete workers, electricians, and heavy equipment operators 
will all be needed.
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CROSS-SECTORAL, CONSIDERATIONS
I. BACKGROUND
The ability of the reconstruction program to swiftly undertake and 
complete activities in one sector (i.e., housing) may be dependent on 
initiating or completing activities in another. For example, agricultural 
rehabilitation in some areas will be dependent on repair and rehabilita­
tion of the area’s irrigation systems. In these cases, actions in one 
area may influence the timing, sequence, cost, and possibly the priority 
of other actions. In other cases, actions in one sector may provide jobs 
which give people the opportunity to obtain the necessary capital to 
participate more fully in the various reconstruction programs. For 
example, labor-intensive road reconstruction programs can provide tempor­
ary jobs throughout the affected zone, enabling workers to earn money for 
rebuilding their homes.
II. CROSS-SECTORAL LINKAGES
Recovery in the private sector (housing, agriculture, fishing, busi­
ness and industry) will be closely linked to public sector activities. 
Likewise, in some cases full recovery of a public sector endeavor or 
enterprise will be dependent upon recovery in the private sector. These 
relationships are fairly easy to see. The following is a summary of the 
principal linkages between sectors.
A* Housing: Construction of housing will be affected most by the avail­
ability of cash. Road construction activities, especially for rural 
roads, can provide much-needed temporary employment and inject needed 
capital into the smaller communities. Since road repairs are labor- 
intensive, can be undertaken in every community, and are the public 
sector activity likely to create the most temporary jobs, they should 
receive the highest priority of all public sector activities.
The cost of housing reconstruction will also be affected by the avail­
ability of building materials and their transient costs. Reestablish­
ment of the rail system, and repair of roads and bridges, will all 
play a part in reducing overall costs to individual families.
Restoration of public buildings such as schools, hospitals, etc., will 
have a spin-off effect on housing reconstruction. Not only will a 
small number of jobs be created, but large-scale construction will 
also have an effect on building material availability and price. As a 
general rule, initiation of these works will cause a rise in material 
prices and in some local cases make some materials temporarily 
unavailable; however, in the larger communities this will have a 
negligible impact compared to reconstruction of the commercial zones. 
Therefore, in large communities, there are no special considerations 
but, in small communities, it may be wise to delay reconstruction of 
large buildings until local people have had an ox)portunity to buy the 
materials necessary for their own rebuilding.
Agriculture: Agricultural rehabilitation will be most directly
affected by rehabilitation of irrigation systems. In some areas, 
repairs will be mandatory in order for farmers to have any decent crop 
yield. Some repair's will provide wages for farmers. {Note: It has
been proposed by some donors that repair of irrigation systems be 
carried out under food-for-work programs. It is the feeling of the 
assessment mission that cash-for-work would be preferable since it is 
likely that recipients would sell a portion of the food, thereby 
depressing the market for those farmers who are able to produce some 
crops. However, there may be some urgent food needs in the drought- 
affeeted areas where food-for-work schemes could be undertaken with 
negligible consequences.)
Indirectly, agricultural rehabilitation can be affected by road 
repair. Workers from neighboring farms can earn needed capital to 
rehabilitate their lands and to buy needed supplies, and the repaired 
roads will facilitate the marketing of agricultural products. Rehab­
ilitation of the transport network will also facilitate micro-scale 
marketing (garden vegetables, etc.).
"" Fhshing. Restoration of the full potential of the fishing sector will 
be influenced only indirectly by public sector activites. Restoration 
of the electrical system will permit cold storage to resume; restor­
ation of the transport system will facilitate marketing; and restor­
ation of water supplies to some areas will permit resumption of 
commercial processing.
D * Commercial and Industrial Sectors: Reconstruction of both large and
small commmercial and industrial enterprises will be affected 
indirectly by restoration of roads (facilitating marketing) and 
communications (operations and marketing). In some cases, recon­
struction will be directly accelerated by restoring supplies of 
electricity (facilitating operations and manufacturing) and water 
(which will permit resumption of some forms of manufacturing). 
Priorities for these activities will have to be determined at the 
local level and based on how many jobs are affected.
III. CROSS-SECTORAL COORDINATION
In order to undertake all project activities in such a manner that the 
cross-sectoral benefits are maximized, effective coordination and planning 
will be vital. This may be difficult in a country that has over 30 dif­
ferent ministries. Therefore, it will be necessary to establish a strong 
coordination capability at both local and national levels. Two things 
wij] be required: national and local coordinating committees. and nation­
al and local reconstruction plans.
A • ( 1 i ng Commi ttees: Under the current governmental structure, 
the means for coordination already exist. At the national level, the 
Ministry of Finance & Planning has the ability to coordinate by virtue 
of allocating funds; at the district level, the Government Agent has 
responsibility for coordinating programs in the district. In the case
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of ^ ie , devolution is not likely to affect administration and
management, what will change is the policy-making authority and the 
chain of authority from the policy-makers to the GA.
In an aide memoire submitted by the World Bank Assessment Team to the 
Government of Sri Lanka in September 1987, a management framework of 
reconstruction committees was proposed to guide the program until 
devolution occurs. At that time the committee structure could be 
changed,
To set overall reconstruction policy at the district level, a District 
Reconstruction Coordinating Committee (DRCC) would be established to 
coordinate operations and pave the way for the new governmental struc­
ture to take over more direct management of the program when the 
devolution process commences. The DRCC would be headed by the dis­
trict GA and would include representatives from: NHDA; RDA; Ministries 
of Agriculture, Fishing, Education, Public Health; and local citizen’s 
groups. Representatives of NGOs, as well as those agencies such as 
Energy, telecommunications, etc., with unique responsibilities in the 
affected areas (but which are independent and do not lend themselves 
to being coordinated at the district level, nor provide a substantial 
number of jobs, nor compete for other resources) would be invited as 
ex officio members.
In some districts a technical secretariat would be formed to assist 
the GA in day-to-day operations and to assist the committee in its 
work. The secretariat would include, but not be limited to, a program 
coordinator, an engineer, an agricultural and fishing specialist, an 
accountant, and a data processor. The necessary bookkeepers, file 
clerks and secretaries to assist the technical secretariat would be 
provided by the GA’s office.
To ensure ..hat people from each affected area are we11-represented, a 
number of citizens representing different sectors of the community 
should be appointed to the committee. These could include elected 
representatives oi agricultural and fishing cooperatives, small 
business organizations, and local social welfare groups (NGOs), etc. 
Members from these groups should represent a broad cross-section of 
the people in the area and be able to accurately identify and report 
their needs, problems and aspirations.
The role of the DRCC would be to help the GA prepare coordinated plans 
for reconstruction at the district level, help set priorities, advise 
on needs and probfems of families and groups in the affected commun­
ities, and help monitor the progress of the program. It would provide 
an interim forum for the people in the area to voice their grievances 
to the GA.
In the initial stages of reconstruction, the DRCC should meet on a 
weekly basis; after 6 months, the meetings could be reduced to a 
monthly schedule.
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To coordinate among ministries at the national level and to resolve 
inter-district issues, a National Reconstruction Steering Committee 
(NRSC) would be established. The NRSC would be located in the MOFP 
and chaired by a senior MOFP offical. Members would include: GAs from 
the affected areas (10 districts); Secretaries of the Ministries of 
Local Government, Housing & Construction, Agriculture, Health, Educa­
tion, Plan Implementation, Rehabilitation; and the Director of the 
Road Development Authority. Other ministries which would have only a 
limited or short-term responsibility (such as Regional Development, 
Rural Development and Cooperatives, etc.) would sit as ex officio 
members in the initial stages of reconstruction and later as neces­
sary. Representatives of Sarvodaya and possibly one other national 
NGO would also be invited to sit on the committee.
Hie operations of the NRSC would be assisted by a Secretariat made up 
of a Director, two coordinators and a technical staff consisting of 
two engineers, an agricultural specialist, a housing specialist, a 
fisheries specialist, a chief accountant/auditor, a social welfare 
officer, and a transport specialist/logistician. Support staff would 
include bookkeepers, secretaries, drivers, etc.
Tne role of the Secretariat wTould be to assist the committee in 
coordinating and monitoring the overall reconstruction program and 
handling day-to-day activities on behalf of the committee and the MOFP 
in theii roles oi reviewing project proposals, ensuring coordination 
between sectors and districts, assisting fund transfers, and resolving 
bottlenecks and disputes.
Due to the difficulty (and expense) of getting all the GAs together 
periodically, it may be necessary to establish a working sub-committee 
at the Colombo level. This sub-committee would be convened on a 
bi-weekly basis to deal with matters of coordination among ministries 
only. The full committee should meet on a monthly basis.
The reconstruction management structure recommended in the aide 
memoire will influence the way decisions are made by: 1) adding
representation from the affected areas to policy-making at the 
national program coordination level; and 2) creating a policy/planning 
advisory body at the local level to assist the GAs. In other words, 
instead of reporting exclusively to the Ministry of Local Government, 
the GAs would take (only) reconstruction policy guidance from the 
local District Reconstruction Coordinating Committee until devolution 
is finalized.
R. R^ onstj^jction Plans: Formal, written reconstruction plans at both
the national and local levels can provide a basis for coordination and 
can help alleviate the worries of the local people concerning control 
being wrested from them. The process of preparing the plans can be 
undertaken simultaneously at all levels and would involve the full 
participation of the committees proposed in A above.
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The process should begin at the Local level. District Reconstruction 
Coordinating Committees should coordinate preparation of local 
reconstruction plans. Each plan should elaborate local needs, define 
priorities, establish reconstruction policies, describe sectoral 
plans, consider the cross-sectoral implication of specific activities, 
and help review the local budget. The principal elements of the local 
plans should be depicted on a bar chart or other simplified graphic 
schedule. In order to assist and speed preparation of the local
plans, some model plans should be prepared which the local committees 
could use as a guide.
In order to provide more accurate data for planning sectoral activi­
ties and programs, it will be necessary to carry out more detailed 
assessments in some areas. Involving the committees at the local 
level in the assessment process should reduce fears that all needs are 
not being considered.
Support for the preparation of local plans would be provided through 
the Technical Secretariat of the DRCC, possibly with input from the 
Ministry of Rehabilitation. (The capabilities of the Ministry to 
assist the local committees may need to be strengthened. This could 
include supporting the Ministry with appropriate technical assistance, 
especially regarding how to facilitate the local planning process.)
It may also require providing electronic data (and word) processing 
capabilities to the secretariats.
It should be noted that reconstruction and the process of planning is 
fairly straightforward. Many activities such as road or bridge 
reconstruction will be determined more by technical than by other 
considerations. If local people are represented in the process and if 
the plans are properly presented, there should be no reason for local 
people to fear that the process is somehow out of their hands. In 
previous reconstruction programs, it has been noted that plans drawn 
up by victims’ committees provided with technical assistance are 
similar and comparable to plans prepared by authorities without 
citizen involvement. Therefore, neither government nor local people 
should be wary of the process. If efforts are taken to capacitate the 
committees, the planning process should move quickly and smoothly and 
local concerns can be greatly tempered.
When assigning responsibilities to the local committees, it is 
important to:
1. assign a strict deadline for the plan (2-3 weeks maximum);
2. ask the committee to prepare a list of activities that can 
commence or continue while the plan is under preparation.
Under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance & Planning, a compre­
hensive National Reconstruction Plan should be compiled and, where 
necessary, further elaborated. Preparation of the National Plan 
provides the NRSC with an opportunity to review the overall recon­
struction effort and its goals, establish national reconstruction
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policies and priorities, review cross-sectoral implications and needs, 
assign clear and appropriate responsibilities, and prepare a national 
budget. The principal elements of the Plan should be integrated into 
a network diagram (e.g., PERT or a computer-based program). The 
donors should provide technical assistance as necessary to prepare the 
Plan m  a swift and orderly manner. The Plan should state clearly how 
the government will transfer appropriate elements of the program to 
local authorities when the final form of devolution is agreed upon.
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EMPLOYMENT GENERATION
I. BACKGROUND
Reconstruction activities in both the public and private sectors will 
create employment opportunities. How many new jobs will be created and 
how much total cash will be provided (and needed) will be greatly affected 
by both planning rind sequencing of the reconstruction program and its 
sub-activities. The greatest impact of reconstruction on employment will 
be in restoration of jobs that existed before the hostilities. As soon as 
peace is secured, people will resume their normal work. But reconstruc­
tion will also require additional labor to repair and rebuild physical 
structures in the affected zones. In addition, the programming of 
reconstruction assistance to promote long-term development objectives, 
improve the quality of infrastructure, and expand high-potential employ­
ment activities if properly planned —  can provide new employment 
opportunities. Even so, it should be remembered that reconstruction 
empolyment will have only a short-term impact and that few long-term jobs 
will be generated.
The employment that will be created can be classified as short—term,
(a few weeks to several months), medium-term (jobs created by, and likely 
to last for, the duration of reconstruction) and permanent employment.
The following is a summary of the employment opportunities that could be 
created.
j?.rivate Sector Employment: Most jobs in the fishing, commercial and
industrial sectors will be due to the restoration of jobs that existed 
before the conflict. In the building sector (housing, commercial and 
industrial buildings, public buildings), a large number of new jobs 
will be created, although most of only short- and medium-term 
duration. The following is an estimate of the employment created in
each job category per year:
Short-term employment: 
Medium-term employment 
Permanent employment:
Jobs 
4,000 
: 1,800 
1,200
Work Days 
624,000 
561,600 
374,400
Income (Rs.) 
46.8 million 
42.1 
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Of these new jobs, approximately 90% will be in actual construction, 
and 10% in the production, sale and transport of building materials.
Judging by past major reconstruction programs, employment in the 
construction industry will have the greatest impact on lowering 
overall unemployment rates. For example, in Guatemala, reconstruc­
tion activities are estimated to have reduced nationwide unemployment 
by 12% in the first two years after the 1976 earthquake; but after 4 
years, the unemployment rate returned to within 2% of the pre—disaster 
norm (Bates et, al, University of Georgia).
Public Sector Employment: Reconstruction and rehabilitation activi­
ties in the public sector will create the majority of job opportuni­
ties during the reconstruction period. The following is a summary:
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JOBS WORK DAYS INCOME (Rs.)
1. Road reconstruction:
2.
6.
Short-term employment: 4,000 16,000 4.8 million
Medium-term employment: 1,000 126,000 5.0
Permanent employment: 250 78,000 3.1
TOTAL 220,000 12.9 million
Restoration of the electrical energy distribution system:
Short-term employment: 300 46,800 1.4 million
Medium-term employment: 100 31,200 1.2
Permanent employment: 50 15,600 .78
TOTAL 93,600 3.38 million
Restoration of telecommunications:
Short-term employment: 400 62,400 1.87 million
Medium-term employment: 150 46,800 1.87
Permanent employment: 50 15,600 .78
TOTAL 124,800 4.52 million
Restoration of the water distributi.on system:
Short-term employment: 200 102,400 3.0 million
Medium-term employment: 50 15,600 .6
Permanent employment: 20 6,240 .3
TOTAL 124,240 3.9 million
Rehabilitation of irrigation systems:
Short-term employment: 2,000 50,000 1.5 million
Medium-term employment: 50 7,800 .3
Permanent employment: 10 3,120 .15
TOTAL 60,920 1.95 million
Restoration of public transport and rail:
Short-term employment: 500 45,000 1.35 million
Medium-term employment: 100 15,600 .62
Permanent employment: 25 7,800 .39
TOTAL 68,400 2.36 million
The total number of jobs created by reconstruction of the principal 
public sector structures and systems is estimated as:
Short-term employment: 
Medium-term employment: 
Permanent employment: 
TOTAL
Jobs
7,400
3,950
405
11,755
Work Days
322,600
243,000
126,360
691,960
Income (Rs.) 
13.92 million 
9.59 
5.5
29.01 million
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RETURNING REFUGEES
AND THEIR IMPACT ON TILE MANNAR DISTRICT
Summary. Ihe Mannar District is likely to require special attention
due to a combination of problems including: a high percen­
tage of refugees returning from India who are related to the 
fighters ol the LTTE; a high percentage of returning widows 
and children; a drought in the zone; and extreme poverty in 
the area.
I. BACKGROUND
Ihe Mannar District lies on the northwestern edge of the island.
Mannar Island, which is connected to the main island by a short causeway 
and bridge, juts westward approximately 80 kilometers reaching towards the 
southeastern tip of India just 30 kilometers away. The ferry between
Mannar Island and Rameswaram, Tamil Nadu, is the traditional gateway to 
and from India.
The area is flat and dry; there are no forests. Overall, it is one of 
the poorest areas in the country. Most of the inhabitants are farmers or 
ishermen. The bay north of Mannar Island is shallow and considered 
unproductive for large-scale fishing. Nevertheless, many of the people in 
the area do fish, although most are only subsistence fishermen who stay 
close to the shore and live along the bay shore in extremely marginal huts 
made of wocxi sticks and cadjan mats.
Farms in the area are generally quite small, averaging less than 1.5 
acres, and irrigation systems are not as well developed as in other parts 
of the north and east. Agricultural production in this district is one of 
the lowest in the country.
Christians form the largest (42%) religious group (most fishermen are 
Christian), followed by Muslims (28%) and Hindus (27%).
II. ORIGIN OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM
A ‘ Pg--ttern °f Conflict: The Sri Lanka Army (SLA) maintained a base near
Mannar town at the beginning of the conflict. During the fighting, 
the base became an important command post for the army, not only for 
land operations in the zone but also as a base for interdicting arms 
shipped from India. Helicopters operating out of the base were 
assigned to monitor the Palk Strait and attack boats suspected of 
carrying arms. The level of confict around the post was intense and 
many surrounding villages were completely demolished. Approximately 
25,000 people were displaced in the fighting.
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As the fighting escalated, large numbers of Tamils began to leave Sri 
Lanka for India. From 1983 to the end of 1984, the ferry between Sri 
Lanka and India was still operating; the people who left entered India 
legally and went through normal customs formalities. Most were given 
temporary work permits and settled with relatives or friends. The 
numbers, while large (approximately 150,000), were manageable since 
the inflow was gradual and the people were quickly absorbed. None of 
these early refugees were in camps,
B * TheJExclusion Zone and Subsequent Refugee Migration: In early 1985
m  order to stem the flow of arms to Sri Lanka, the government 
declared an exclusion zone in the Strait and warned that any boats in 
the zone would be subject to attack by the Sri Lanka Armed Forces. 
Helicopters began armed patrols over the area and several boats were 
attacked. As a result, the fishermen of the area suddenly found 
themselves unable to sustain their livelihood and, within only a few 
months, almost 40,000 fled in their boats to India with their 
families. Due to the large number of sudden arrivals, the Government 
of India established a series of refugee camps for the newcomers.
B tment of the Refugees: Once the refugees were placed in camps, 
they became easy targets for rebel recruiters, and overnight the LTTE 
ranks swelled. Training bases were established near the camps. Soon 
many of the men were making their way back to Sri Lanka as insur­
gents. Throughout the remainder of the conflict, the refugee 
community supplied the bulk of the rank and file fighters.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Refugees and displaced persons from Mannar may have a significant 
impact on the reconstruction program for several reasons. First and 
foremost, a high percentage of the rebel forces that are still armed are 
from Mannar. Since the area is so poor, it will be hard to provide good 
work for the people in the area. Even Mannar town is not likely to 
generate much new work; the levels of damage in the town are light and 
will not create many new jobs. Housing losses in the surrounding area are 
heavy but the houses are likely to be rebuilt by the owners themselves, 
not by contracted laborers. A restless, armed population could be very 
problematic.
Problems are likely in providing initial assistance to the families of 
fishermen. Since their houses were made of sticks and mats, most deter­
iorated quickly and vanished during the time they were gone. When the 
government enumerated damaged structures, there was nothing to see; thus, 
the huts were not listed in the damage figures. Since the refugees were 
still in India, there was no one to interview regarding damages, so most 
of the fishemen and their families are not on the lists.
While replacement of the huts will not be a problem because most of 
the materials can be found locally, the families’ eligibility for 
financial compensation may be affected since at present eligibility is
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determined by losses to property, i.e., if you lost your house, you are 
entitled to various endemnities; if your damaged house is not on the 
rolls, you don t qualify. In Mannar, it will probably be necessary to 
re-enumerate the lists to qualify all those entitled to aid. How quickly 
and thoroughly this is done will be an important factor in determining how 
smoothly reconstruction proceeds in the area.
A social pioblem that the government will face is that many of the 
ieturning refugees are widows of LTTE fighters. UNHCR reports that a high 
percentage are from Mannar. UNHCR also reports that most have dependent 
children. Unskilled widows will require special services, and new job 
opportunites need to be considered. Specialists in "women in development" 
Programs should be engaged early in the reconstruction effort.
A final consideration is the drought that is affecting the zone. Not 
onlv will this create additional hardship on the farmers in the area but, 
if food shortages develop, food prices are likely to increase. Given the 
lack of jobs, the cost of reconstruction and other factors, rising food 
prices could lead to widespread malnutrition and could trigger social 
unrest.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
For all the aforementioned reasons, the Mannar District should be 
designated a special priority zone for reconstruction.
^ Reconstruction Program : As a first step, all reconstruc­
tion efforts should be integrated to achieve the maximum impact. An 
integrated reconstruction program, using many of the same techniques 
for planning and programming funds as IRDPs, should be considered for 
the coastal zones. The reconstruction program should be designed to 
make long-term contributions to development of the area.
B. gpecial Assistance for Returnees: In discussions with the UNHCR
assessment mission (led by Kasidis Ramandakorn), I have recommended 
that they enter into a collaborative program with the government and a 
large NGO (such as CARE) to initiate a series of special assistance 
projects that are targeted generally at the refugees but will also 
support the integrated reconstruction program suggested above. Among 
the programs that I have suggested are:
1. special assistance for women with dependent children.
2. creation of special jobs programs to provide interim work for 
fishermen and low-income farmers.
3. programs for rehabilitating and improving the fishing sector, 
such as provision ot technical assistance to organize fishing 
cooperatives, possibly around the "cooperative boathouse" 
concept.
Assistance in reconstruction of fishing villages with special 
attention focused on planning, provision of decent services 
(especially clean water), and upgrading the housing standards of 
the people.
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RESETTLEMENT AND REPATRIATION
OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS
During the fighting, as many as 150,000 people fled the immediate zone 
of conflict for shelter in other communities in the north and east, an 
additional 50—75,000 sought sanctuary in other parts of the country, and 
as many as 200,000 sought refuge in India. (An unknown, but large, number 
of people also immigrated to other continents during the conflict but will 
not be considered in this report, since it is doubtful they will soon 
return.)
Many of the people who were displaced but remained inside Sri Lanka 
(referred to herein as displaced persons or "DPs") were admitted to camps 
established by the government and supplied by the Ministry of Rehabili­
tation. The people were registered and received rations and other 
assistance on a regular basis. Since the end of hostilities, the 
government has begun to make arrangements for people to return to their 
homes. Plans now call for the GA in the district where the people are 
residing in a camp to issue them either transport or a bus or rail pass 
giving them and their belongings free passage home. Once the family has 
returned to their home district, they are supposed, to show their camp 
registration card or a letter from the GA to the local GA and be enrolled 
for benefits. These include: 1) a "settling in" allowance; 2) a housing 
reconstruction allowance; and 3) agricultural or fishing rehabilitation 
allowances. (Other assistance is being contemplated.)
Since the amount of belongings that DPs have accumulated is relatively 
small, no additional transport is required. In the opinion of the World 
Bank Assessment Team, the program sufficiently covers resettlement needs 
and, since all assistance is issued at the returning end, people quickly 
enter the normal caseload. There is no requirement at this time for 
additional forms of assistance. Furthermore, there should be no need to 
make alternative transport arrangements since the distances are fairly 
short, as the bus network resumes, there should be adequate capacity to 
move the people at low cost.
Refugees returning from India will be assisted by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees. The High Commissioner has sent an assess­
ment team to Sri. Lanka to determine repatriation needs and to formulate an 
assistance program, An initial contribution of 1.0 million dollars was 
made to the Ministry of Rehabilitation’s funds for settling-in and housing 
allowances, and to reimburse the government for costs of moving refugees 
from their point of re-entry to their homes. Discussions with the UNHCR 
Sii Lanka desk ofiicers indicate that UNHCR will issue an appeal and may 
provide up to 3.5 million dollars for: 1) establishment and operation of
a repatriation center (in Trincomalee); 2) trucks to move returnees from 
the repatriation center to their homes; and 3) grants and loans to help 
economic reintegration. If the appeal is well-subscribed, additional 
assistance may be contemplated. The assessment team feels that the assis­
tance offered by UNHCR, if integrated into the general reconstruction 
plans, should be sufficient to meet the needs of returning refugees and 
that no additional assistance will be required beyond the normal package 
of aid that is available to all.
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PROGRAM CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING TRINCOMALEE AND BATTICALOA
Summary: Due to the ethnic makeup of these two areas, tensions are
likely to remain high and further displacements of people 
are likely to occur when the final form of devolution is 
announced. Special attention should be given to certain 
groups among the affected population, and some funds should 
be held in reserve to assist relocation and reduce the 
potential for population shifts becoming violent.
I. BACKGROUND
A - DglBQgraphic Factors: The population of the cities of Batticaloa and
Iiincomalee is made up ol Bhuddist Sinhalese, Tamil Hindus and Tamil 
Muslims in approximately the following percentages:
Sinhalese: 
Hindu: 
Muslim:
Batticaloa
3%
71%
24%
Trincomalee
34%
34%
29%
® ’ Localized Conilicts: During the conflict, the Muslim community
largely sided with the Sinhalese and the Sri Lanka government. In 
these two cities, this triggered a small "war within a war" as Hindu 
and Muslim communities clashed over this issue and other, older 
grievances. Sometimes, there was simply a settling of old feuds 
between families but, in a number of cases, communal violence broke 
out and whole neighborhoods or commercial districts were sacked. In 
these areas, tensions are still high.
II. POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES
Due to the ethnic makeup of the area, the political future is a bit 
uncertain. Batticaloa, which is farther south than Trincomalee, should be 
included if not for geography; while in Trincomalee, the Muslim community 
could be the swing vote, although they are most likely to vote to stay in 
a non-Hindu zone. Whether or not the eastern zones are included in an 
autonomous Tamil district, it is likely that some population shifts will 
occur when the final demarcation of Tamil areas is announced. If the 
cities are included in the Tamil area, the Muslims and a large portion of 
the Sinhalese are likely to leave; if the zone remains out of the Tamil 
district, a number of Tamil Hindus are likely to migrate north. In other 
situations where "partitions" have occurred (such as in India in 1947), 
the announcements have teen followed by a period of violence and spon­
taneous relocation of minority populations.
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
As a way of reducing the levels of violence, it will be important that 
funds be available to help people resettle and adjust to their new situa­
tion. A program of assistance for those wishing to relocate should be 
announced before the final form of devolution is announced and the Tamil 
areas are demarcated.
Other recommended actions are:
1. Target the two urban areas for early assistance.
2. Target commercial reconstruction assistance for these areas.
3. Set aside some funds for local resettlement (within the cities) 
when devolution plans are announced.
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IMPACT OF THE DROUGHT ON RECONSTRUCTION
Summary: A drought is affecting portions of the reconstruction zone.
Ibis will cause additional hardship for persons in the area 
and may affect the progress of reconstruction. Special 
allowances and considerations may be necessary for victims 
of both conflict and drought.
I. BACKGROUND
The northern districts of Sri Lanka are experiencing the same drought 
conditions that now prevail over much of the subcontinent. Some areas of 
Jaffna, Mannar, Mullaittivu and Vavuniya have not had significant amounts 
of rain for over two years. During field visits to the area, the Assess­
ment. learn noted that most of the tanksf used for irrigation were com­
pletely dry and those with water would not have enough to irrigate for a 
complete season. (My personal estimate for the Mannar and Vavuniya 
districts is that 80% of the tanks are completely dry, 15% have enough 
water for partial irrigation, and 5% could provide enough for the entire 
season. Areas to the east, serviced by the Mahawelli scheme, appear to be 
OK.) As the winter rainy season is approaching, this situation could 
change overnight; but for planning purposes, it should be assumed that the 
rains will again be light and insufficient.
Die drought is occurring in the poorest agricultural zones of the 
region. Yields here are much lower per acre than in other areas, and many 
farmers are producing little more than subsistence crops. Traditionally,' 
these people have been the most difficult to reach with development 
assistance.
In a drought situation, a common survival strategy for rural people is 
to move to cities to seek temporary employment. Unfortunately, there are 
no large cities or towns in the immediate vicinity of the drought zones. 
Mannar, Vavuniya and Kilinochchi towns are all fairly small and are not 
likely to have sufficient employment, even with reconstruction, to provide 
adequate income to offset agricultural earnings.
farmers in this pant Qf Sri Lanka use an above-ground irrigation system 
unique to the country, according to John Flynn, the AID agricultural 
specialist assigned to the World Bank Assessment Team. Rather than exca­
vating an area and pumping the water up into irrigation canals, Sri 
Lankans locate natural catchment areas and build retaining dams across the 
upper portions. Shallow reservoirs form behind the dams above ground 
level with just enough water to irrigate the catchment area below the 
dam. The reservoirs rarely need to be desilted since most of the silt is 
deposited on the fields below the dam. In order to utilize as much land 
as possible for growing crops, the tanks are fairly small, usually holding 
only a year’s supply of water.
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One of the districts, Mannar, has the highest percentage of returning 
refugees and will need special attention for that reason alone (see appen- 
dix on "Returning Refugees..."). It is believed that a significant number 
ol the LTTE fighters are from this zone, especially Mannar. This could 
have a major impact on civil stability in the area.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
iho drought may have several consequences for the reconstruction
program:
A. Agricultural reconstruction is likely to be delayed; it will be more 
difficult and, consequently, more costly.
B * Jt wil1 be necessary to provide sufficient alternative employment for 
farmers to help them make it through the drought.
C. Agricultural credit schemes must consider the impact of the drought 
when scheduling repayment of loans (i.e., a grace period may be 
required).
D. Since food aid will probably be necessary, it will be important to 
establish a food monitoring system to facilitate accurate targeting of 
the food in order to avoid over-supplying the area, which would 
undercut market prices and have a negative impact on what little 
production might be possible.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following actions are recommended:
A. Drought areas should be identified and monitored, initially on a 
fortnightly basis. Monitoring should include:
1. prices of agricultural commodities;
2. nutrition levels, especially for children under 5;
3. unemployment levels and wage rates (to detect drops);
4. population shifts induced by the drought;
5. water levels in the reservoirs.
To accomplish the above, the Ministry of Rehabilitation should be 
given training on how to monitor droughts and food shortages and how 
to provide food to people at the village level. Any reports on food 
production estimates, generated by FAO or AID FEWS as part of the 
general monitoring of conditions on the subcontinent, should be for­
warded to the Ministry on a regular basis.
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I*. As a precaution, food stocks in the affected zones should be bol­
stered. (VIFP has already offered to provide some additional food.) 
Prior to distribution, a comprehensive food distribution policy should 
be established and suitable distribution strategies adopted. Food- 
for-work programs should be thoroughly considered prior to initiation.
t. All drought zones should be targeted for special, early assistance.
D. Public works programs should concentrate on land rehabilitation, 
impioving agricultural infrastructure, and expansion of irrigation
systems.
r. Priority should be given to labor-intensive road reconstruction and 
repair work in the drought-affected areas as a means of providing 
alternative employment opportunities.
F' As an alternative way of keeping farmers in production, the government 
may wish to consider short-term leasing of irrigated land in other 
areas to farmers from drought zones. Farmers would be paid to clear 
and prepare the land, then plant and cultivate a crop. In this way 
food production losses for the country would be minimized and new 
agricultural land would be opened up. If farmers are compensated for 
the improvements they make to the land, they could earn enough money 
to rehabilitate their own farms once the drought is over and they 
return to their land. (Land lease programs that could provide a model 
for the necessary implementing arrangements were established during a 
Jamaican drought in 1979. They were facilitated by church agencies.)
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NOTES ON CASH DISBURSEMENTS TO DISPLACED PERSONS
Summary: Disbursement of funds to displaced persons appears to be 
problematic in several areas. The disbursement process 
needs to be monitored to ensure that people receive the 
money to which they are entitled.
I. BACKGROUND
A„Prif.S the asaistao0f f VenU °  victims of the conflict, GovernmentAgents (GAs) in each district have been allocated funds to give' 1) to
persons who have been displaced by the fighting; 2) to families that have 
lost their homes, and 3) to farmers who have been forced off their lands. 
Allocations range from a 1000-rupee "settling in" allowance to a 3000- 
rupee grant to help in rebuilding homes.
USAID Mission.°f ^  f°r the grants-in~aid has 15(300 provided by the
II. OBSERVATIONS
haveDret,ng ^  “ s.esf"ent. f?eld ^ips, I met several displaced persons who have returned to their original villages from DP camps in other dis­
tricts. On each occasion I asked what kind of assistance they had 
received and what kind of additional assistance they expected or had been
were get' In a11 Cases, the people had received nothing 
and had not been informed about their eligibility for assistance. Several
“ hey 5ad heard rumors that they would be given 10,000 rupees each but 
were uncertain where it was to come from and when to expect it.
During a visit to Trincomalee, I talked with several Tamils who had 
just returned from a camp near Jaffna. Upon leaving the camp, each had 
been issued a letter by the GA stating that they were "refugees" and had
ln a government-supported camp. I learned from the assistant 
that this was the document used to qualify people for assistance. Use 
or this letter presents several problems;
A. The letter is in English, a language no one in the village can read.
B. There is no date on the letter.
C. There is no description of what, if any, assistance to which the 
bearer is entitled.
D. There are no instructions telling the bearer where to go for further 
information or assistance.
E * 1S n° identification number, no place for a countersignature of
the bearer, nor any way of identifying the bearer such as a photo, 
thumbprint, etc.
F. There is no original signature of the issuing officer.
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In other words, the letter would be easy to forge and counterfeit, it 
provides no way to trace what kind of assistance has been issued, and it 
does not gi\e any guidance whatsoever to the bearer. If the government 
continues to use this method, it will be impossible to monitor the program 
and widespread graft/misuse of funds is sure to occur. Even if the 
program were to be honestly administered and the recipients were not prone 
to trying to beat the system, many people would still fail to receive 
their fair share of the benefits.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following actions are recommended:
A. A national beneficiary registration system should be established. The 
system should be designed so that registration leads directly to 
referral to the appropriate agency for assistance and puts the family 
squarely in the casework.
B. A standard beneficiary identification card should be issued. It is 
recommended that a plastic card with an ID photo of the head of house— 
hold toe used. It is also recommended that each card have icons 
denoting the assistance people should receive. As each type of assis­
tance is given, the icon can be punched out with a hole punch. If the 
bearer is not entitled to one or more categories of assistance, those 
icons can be punched at the time of issue. As each family receives 
its card, the particulars and the registration number would be noted 
in a registration book and the head of the family would countersign 
the notation. The cards should be printed in Tamil and Sinhalese.
Notes. At the suggestion of Peter Bloom, AID Mission Director, I 
discussed this with Austin Fernando, Secretary of the Ministry of 
Rehabilitation. He promised to look into the matter and said he would 
consider these proposals. I feel, however, that AID should take it up 
again at an early date since the Mission is providing the funds and would 
have more clout with the Ministry.
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CENTRALIZED CASEWORK AND JOB REFERRAL SYSTEM
In order to ensure that all beneficiaries receive the assistance to 
which they are entitled, to speed the delivery of benefits, and to reduce 
the possibility of cheating, a centralized system for processing claims 
and referring them to the proper sources of assistance will be needed.
I. BENEFITS
A preliminary list of the benefits for which individuals and families 
may be eligible includes:
Rs. 1,500 "settling in" allowance for displaced persons/refugees;
—  Rs. 3,000 housing rehabilitation allowance;
—  Rs. 1,200 agricultural rehabilitation allowance;
—  Rs. 3,500 - 7,000 low-interest housing loan;
Subsidized building materials allocation;
—  Irrigation rehabilitation grant;
—  Agricultural tool allowance;
—  Fisheries recovery grant.
In addition, people are likely to be eligible for some forms of 
assistance from NGOs such as:
—  f ood;
—  clothing;
—  matching grants for housing reconstruction;
—  immunizations for returning refugee children.
Finally, as public sector reconstruction begins, it will be important 
to channel the most deserving victims into the work force.
II. REGISTRATION
The key to a successful casework system is a standardized central 
registration system. Such a system requires:
1. Provision of all assistance to people at their place of residence 
(except for transport home in the case of refugees);
2. A standard registration card that clearly lists (or depicts with 
icons) the types of assistance for which people are eligible;
3. A central permanent register where people’s benefits are recorded 
and where people sign or initial the ledger to indicate they have 
received the benefits; and
4. A central claims office where people can go for one-time 
processing of their claims and to receive any cash that is due.
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The system should work as follows:
Central claims offices should be set up at convenient and accessible 
locations throughout the affected areas.
Notices informing the public that assistance is available and where to 
go would then be posted throughout the area, supported by radio 
announcements, newspaper notices and other appropriate media. The notices 
would tell the people to bring the following to the claims office: 1)
their identity card; 2) a passport photo; 3) any letters or documents they 
have been issued previously indicating they are eligible for assistance 
(especially refugee ID cards, etc.).
Persons comming to the office would be met by a counsellor who would 
conduct a preliminary screening interview to determine: 1) if all the
person’s documents are in order; 2) the place of residence; and 3) the 
services for which the person appears to be eligible. If the person has 
all the necessary papers and/or his/her identity card, he/she is issued a 
registration card, a photo is attached, and the new bearer signs the 
card. The recipient’s name and the number of the card is then immediately 
entered into the permanent register. The registrar marks the icons 
representing the benefits for which the person may be eligible on the face 
of the card, then refers him to the appropriate caseworkers in the same 
room so that they can determine whether the person is indeed eligible for 
(he assistance.
The caseworkers interview the card bearer and determine eligibility.
If there is any doubt, a follow-up field visit may be required. When all 
is complete and the various benefits have been determined, the caseworker 
countermarks the registration card. The bearer is then led back to the 
registrar who seals the card in plastic and enters the benefits to which 
the bearer is entitled on the permanent register beside his/her name. If 
the bearer is not entitled to a particular benefit (as determined by the 
unmarked icons on the card), the icon representing that benefit is punched 
out by the registrar.
The bearer of the card may then take the card to the appropriate 
window or agency to claim the assistance that is due. As each form of 
assistance is issued, the beneficiary signs a receipt and the issuing 
officer punches the appropriate icon on the registration card. The 
receipts are then sent back to the registrar who records on the central 
register that the benefits have been received.. (Some materials may be 
provided by commercial suppliers, e.g., building materials. The supplier 
would simply return the receipts for reimbursement from the program.)
If a person needs employment or demonstrates a need for part-time work 
to earn additional money to enable him to reconstruct more quickly, the 
caseworker will make note of this and place his name on a list of eligible 
workers in his community, then public works projects are undertaken in 
the area, workers on that list will have priority for the jobs. (It 
should be the policy of the World. Bank that all reconstruction projects 
utilizing Bank funds give priority to hiring workers whose names appear on 
these lists.)
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STRENGTHENING GOSL CAPACITY TO HANDLE RECONSTRUCTION
Summary: The Government of Sri Lanka is not in a strong position to
monitor and manage the overall reconstruction program, nor 
does it have strong ministries from which to draw support. 
For this reason, it will be necessary to establish a program 
that is well planned, simple to administer, based on 
existing systems, and facilitates close monitoring. In 
addition, the Government may require a degree of technical 
assistance in planning and establishing the monitoring 
capability.
I. BACKGROUND
In initiating the reconstruction program, the GOSL is faced with
several shortcomings and impediments to program implementation. They are:
A. fiie Ministry currently in charge does not have much capacity to manage 
a large program. The staff is very small; it is normally a support 
ministry, not a line ministry; and the head of the Ministry does not 
have cabinet rank. The Secretary of the Ministry is not a senior 
official and, in rank, is generally on the same level as the GAs 
through which he must operate. Unless lines of authority and respon­
sibility are assigned at the highest level, the program is likely to 
suffer from a confusion of authority.
B. None of the principal ministries likely to be involved in reconstruc­
tion activities have systems established to monitor large influxes of 
funds or the programs they will be expected toNconduct. For example, 
the Roads Development Authority (RDA) will be called on to coordinate 
large-scale, labor-intensive construction projects. Normally, the RDA 
does major road work through capital-intensive approaches and con­
tracts much of the work. At present, they do not have the capability 
to manage comprehensive works schemes designed to channel money into 
the devastated communities. While the staff certainly is capable of 
handling the program, it will speed matters if planning and monitoring 
are assisted in the beginning.
C. Initially, the GOSL will rely on the existing government structure to 
administer the reconstruction program. However, when devolution 
occurs, the form of local government may change substantially. For 
this reason, it will be necessary to avoid creating any new government 
entities to administer the program and, to the greatest extent possi­
ble, to assign major responsibilities to entities that will not change 
with the form of government (e.g., co-ops, NGOs, municipal govern­
ments). Since these groups will not have a lot of capacity to 
administer large-scale programs, some technical assistance will be 
needed at this level.
I). Responsibility for implementation of the program will likely be spread 
among many different ministries (the GOSL has over 30!). It will be 
necessary to have a good overall plan to guide reconstruction in order 
to avoid confusion and duplication.
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E. Personnel in the line ministries are not generally sympathetic to the 
peace accord and foot-dragging can be expected at some levels. It 
will be necessary to build-in ways of detecting and overcoming such 
obstacles swiftly. It will be especially important to establish 
milestones for all significant elements of the program.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Long-term and short-term needs and programs should be differentiated. 
Short-term assistance can continue to be funnelled through the Minis­
try of Rehabilitation, while longer-term programs should be coordi­
nated through the Ministry of Finance & Planning.
B. The capabilities of the Ministry of Rehabilitation should be streng­
thened. This includes supporting the Ministry with appropriate 
technical assistance (especially for establishment of the registration 
and casework referral system), providing electronic data processing 
capabilities, and giving the Ministry the necessary funds and equip­
ment to monitor the short-term elements of the program.
C. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance & Planning, a compre­
hensive Reconstruction Plan should be developed. The Plan should 
clearly elaborate the total reconstruction effort, define goals, 
establish reconstruction policies, describe sectoral operations plans, 
assign clear and appropriate responsibilities, and establish a 
budget. The principal elements of the Plan should be integrated into 
a network diagram (e.g., PERT or a computer-based program). Donors 
should provide technical assistance as necessary to prepare the Plan 
in a swift and orderly manner. The Plan should state clearly how the 
government will transfer appropriate elements of the program to local 
authorities when the final form of devolution is decided. The Plan 
should also define an interim management system that can involve Tamil 
leadership in the early phases of program planning and management.
D. In order to provide more accurate data for planning sectoral activi­
ties and programs, it will be necessary to carry out more detailed 
assessments in some areas. With careful planning, the assessments can 
be designed not only to collect the needed data but also to initiate 
the individual casework for each family. Technical assistance on how 
to accomplish this may be necessary.
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